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Abstract
Polanyi saw the economy as properly embedded in society and argued that the capitalist free market, in
commodifying social relations of  production, seeks to disembed the economy from society. The resulting lack
of  continuity between society and economy, he maintained, created conflict which necessarily required state
intervention. The market economy, therefore, in contrast to neoclassical/neoliberal economics’ vision of  an
autonomous, self-regulating market, required more, not less, state intervention to sustain it than alternative,
more embedded economies. This article explores this conflict in the context of  a specific neoliberal claim: that
institutional shareholders are capable of  being good “stewards” of  the companies in which they invest.
Utilising Polanyi’s embeddedness, this article assesses the “stewardship” approach as it is manifested in the
US and in the UK. This approach is posited on a vision of  a disembedded, self-regulating market. Putting
it into practice is thus a retrograde step which will only exacerbate the problems created by the market-based
corporate governance strategies which have prevailed since the late 1970s onwards. 
Introduction
The approach of  this article is to take Polanyi’s notion of  embeddedness and use it toelucidate and comprehend the current conception of  institutional shareholders as
stewards in corporate governance. This new approach to governance requires institutional
shareholders to take an active and socially constructive role in corporate governance and
empowers them, both legally and morally, to do so. This article differs from
contemporaneous work around shareholder stewardship because it aims to refute the idea
that shareholders are capable of  being useful corporate stewards in this sense. By using
contextual analysis, this article contributes to the existing debate on market-based corporate
governance strategies by showing that such strategies cannot thwart institutional
shareholders’ innate drive to seek profit maximisation regardless of  the long-term effects
on the company and those whom the company affects. To act as stewards for a wider public
interest, institutional shareholders would need to be subject to more direct state control. 
Shareholder stewardship is a paradox because shareholders lack the central quality that
underpinned previous conceptions of  stewardship, namely a detachment from share-
ownership and therefore a detachment from a sectional interest in profit. This detachment
1 With thanks to Richard Percival, Law Commission, and Professor Ralf  Rogowski for their helpful comments. 
was thought to enable the steward to pursue a wider public interest.2 Previous conceptions
of  stewardship viewed non-owning professional management as worthy stewards of  the
company’s best interests, precisely because they were non-owning, trained professionals.3
Directors could be good stewards because they were personally motivated by a wide range
of  concerns including personal achievement, good employee relations, product
development and economic stability.4
The idea that large institutional shareholders may also be considered as stewards has
gained momentum in recent years but, unlike the previous conceptions of  stewardship, it is
the fact of  their ownership, indeed the very largeness of  their shareholdings, which has
prompted interest in their role in corporate governance. Institutional ownership not only
appears to subvert the trend to dispersed ownership, evidenced by Berle in Modern
Corporation,5 but the size of  their holdings has led to them being reconceived as “universal
owners” – owners whose stakes are so significant that their self-interest is said to be best
served by ensuring general economic stability and social well being.6 In this model,
institutional shareholders are thought to be predisposed to engage in socially guided
investment policies.7 Indeed, as I show in section three, institutional shareholders have been
keen to promote this image of  the responsible, steward-like investor. 
In assessing the shift to shareholder stewardship, I attempt to embrace Polanyi’s theme
of  embeddedness as expressed in The Great Transformation.8 Polanyi’s notion is that all
economies, including the market economy, are embedded within society and social relations
– although they differ as to the degree that they are embedded, the market economy being
the most disembedded. As a response to the neoclassical economists’ claim that the market
economy sits independent from society as a whole – a claim which is also made by
neoliberalism – Polanyi stated:
Economic history reveals that the emergence of  national markets was in no way the
result of  the gradual and spontaneous emancipation of  the economic sphere from
governmental control. On the contrary, the market has been the outcome of  a conscious
and often violent intervention on the part of  government which imposed the market
organisation on society for non-economic ends.9
The market economy is the least “natural” to human social living and the most
disembedded from natural social relations. It is therefore the most in need of  state
intervention to secure its existence. 
Similarly, it can be argued that the neoliberal project from late 1970s was a political
project to dis-embed the economy from social relations and to ideologically promote the
market economy as self-regulating. In respect of  corporate governance, the market was
promoted as the most efficient regulator. However, as this article shows, the “self-
regulation” of  market players has in fact involved and necessitated a great deal of  state
intervention. In Polanyi’s terms, because the market economy is inherently incompatible
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9 Ibid. p. 258.
with natural human existence, or disembedded, it requires substantial state intervention to
operate. Rather than state intervention being antithetical to the market, it is essential to
discipline people into adhering to their “unnatural” market roles. 
By contrast, in New Deal or progressive America and in post-war UK, governments
(and indeed the general international consensus on macroeconomics) consciously drew
together social outcomes and the economy. Government policy embedded the economy, to
promote stability and equality and to meet the problems caused by the financial crisis of  the
late 1920s in the US, and by post-war need in the UK; and thus both governments de-
prioritised shareholders’ interests. Put another way, by decommodifying social relations of
production it was able to meet social need. 
The article is structured into four parts. Throughout these sections I use Polanyi’s
embeddedness to further my analysis of  stewardship in social and historical context. In
section one, I show how stewardship was first exercised as a deliberate policy technique by
the state in tandem with management in the interests of  the wider public. However, the
proceeding neoliberal model from the 1970s charged management with stewardship in the
interests of  shareholders alone. In section two, I show how the neoliberal response to, first,
corporate collapse and then, more recently, financial crisis was to preserve the free market
shareholder primacy model by more state intervention to bolster self-regulation. In section
three, I show how shareholder stewardship has been promoted, first, by institutional
shareholders themselves and, secondly, through soft and hard law. In section four, I show
that institutional shareholders are a heterogeneous group similar only in their inability to
make a positive impact on corporate governance. 
Shareholder stewardship envisages shareholders actively influencing management to
deliver shareholder value in contrast to the shareholder primacy model where governance
mechanisms were designed to ensure that management delivered value to the essentially
passive shareholders. Furthermore, shareholder stewardship reconceptualises shareholder
value itself  as an (idealised) long-term investment through which socially desirable goals are
pursued; “enlightened shareholder value”, in the language of  company law reform in the
UK. Shareholder stewardship seeks shareholders’ involvement through, largely, soft law
mechanisms. Its aim is that institutional shareholders will ensure a less rapacious form of
capitalism because the rapacious capitalism, which was the result of  the shareholder
primacy model, delivered corporate and financial crisis. 
In this article, I maintain that there is little to suggest that shareholder stewardship will
be any less destructive or rapacious than shareholder primacy, indeed, it is counter-intuitive
to suppose that shareholders will be more moderate in their demands for shareholder value
than management.
1 The historical origins of shareholder stewardship 
THE STATE AND MANAGEMENT AS STEWARDS OF THE COMPANY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE
WIDER COMMUNITY
Stewardship governance was traditionally posited on the existence of  a controlling but non-
owning management. The most famous early exposition of  this development was the
empirical and analytical work of  Modern Corporation.10 In this book, Berle showed how
massive share dispersal in large corporations had resulted in revolutionary changes in
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ownership and control.11 Berle argued that share dispersal had fundamentally transformed
the nature of  share-ownership because, as responsibility was devolved to management,
shareholders could not (logically or normatively) demand the extensive rights generally
attributed to private property. Shareholders had effectively “surrendered the right that the
corporation should be operated in their sole interest” and had accordingly “released the
community from the obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine of
strict property rights”.12 Accordingly, shareholders were entitled to modest returns on their
investment, after the claims of  the community, labour in particular, had been met. Berle’s
analysis was a conscious recognition that society could, and indeed should, use the economy
to meet social ends. And, although Berle initially saw the state as guiding the company to
this end, he came around to the view (maintained earlier by others) that directors were also
principal stewards in delivering governance for the wider community. 
Modern Corporation importantly provided information and direction to the New Deal
administrators about the challenges they faced in the economy and why it should be
regulated. Berle’s role in the administration added force to this.13 The ability of  the New
Dealers to regulate the economy to this degree was premised on an unashamed
interventionist policy.14 Key to this, noted Polanyi, was the abandonment of  the Gold
Standard which removed the power of  financial markets to dictate social policy.15 As a
model for enhancing the stewardship of  states it was later adopted by other countries and
internationalised in the post-war period by arrangements such as the 1944 Bretton Woods
agreement. Reduced capital movement across borders enhanced the ability for national
adjustments to be made in respect of  employment and pricing policies, which helped many
national economies to pursue welfare-orientated policies. In the UK, this included the
nationalisation of  key industries, the empowering of  unions and the bolstering of  socially
orientated funds, particularly pension funds, though tax and dividend reforms. Nationalised
industries were designed to provide secure employment for millions, to stabilise the price of
basic commodities, and to contribute to the well-being of  the community. Their ethos and
institutional goals were thought to infect the operations of  private industries.16
However, the post-war, Keynesian or consciously embedded economy consensus was
shaken by economic industrial crises in the 1970s. Both the economy and ideas about the
economy were to take a radical shift toward the right. Thus, of  the two great books written
at the end of  the war, Polany’s Great Transformation and Hayek’s Road to Serfdom,17 it was the
latter’s ethos that began to prevail. In the UK, recession and public debt caused fatal rifts in
the delicate balance of  power between the tripartite powers of  unions, management and
state. Years of  industrial unrest had fragmented traditional political positions and in 1979
the Conservative party under Margaret Thatcher was voted into government with a new
radical, neoliberal agenda. Likewise, in the US, recession and the threat of  global
competition saw the New Right under Ronald Reagan come into power with a similar
agenda; to promote a free market and to strip away non-market, state-centred regulation.
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11 In this analysis, Berle differed from the previous work because he saw the progressive possibilities from those
changes to the nature of  the modern corporation: W Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (Boston: Little, Brown
& Company 1927); L D Brandeis, Other People’s Money: And how the bankers use it (Connecticut: Martino
Publishing 2009 [1917]); T Veblen, The Theory of  Business Enterprise (New York: Cosimo 2005 [1904]).
12 Berle and Means, Modern Corporation, n. 5 above, p. 312.
13 W W Bratton and M L Wachter, “Shareholder primacy’s corporatist origins: Adolf  Berle and The Modern
Corporation” (2008) 34 Journal of  Corporation Law 99. 
14 J K Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: Houghton Mifflen Co. 1967).
15 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, n. 8 above, p. 237.
16 A Crosland, The Future of  Socialism 50th edn (London: Robinson Publishing 2006).
17 F Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press 1944). 
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Thatcherism and Reaganism thereby became synonymous in policy objectives and
ideological imperatives in the context of  the economy and welfare reform. In the academies,
a sophisticated neoliberal model of  the corporation was being developed. 
THE FASHIONING OF NEOLIBERAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERS AS STEWARDS
OF SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS
In the academies, a neoliberal corporate governance model replaced the old social model.
This model, which I shall term the shareholder primacy model, claims that the pursuit of
shareholder value should be the sole guiding force behind management decision-making. In
so doing, it embraces two key themes, that of  contractarianism and that of  efficiency.
Contractarianism conceives of  the corporation as being a nexus of  contracts,18 so that, in
Jenson and Meckling’s words, “it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things
that are ‘inside’ the firm (or any other organisation) from those things that are outside of
it”.19 The company is merely the market in another guise. In this way, the whole notion of
“ownership as entitlement” which Berle had so apparently successfully debunked is
sidestepped. The rights to which shareholders are entitled come not from their ownership
of  property but from the terms they have negotiated in their contract with management. In
this approach, the arrangement between management and shareholder involves some
“agency costs” (instances when the manager may be guided by self-interest rather than the
interest of  shareholders), which must be addressed by joining managerial goals with
shareholder goals or by mechanisms which penalise managerial self-interest. 
The argument based on efficiency20 asserts that more efficient outcomes are achieved
when management narrowly focuses on shareholders’ interests. Shareholder value is
therefore morally justifiable on utilitarian grounds and does not rely on ownership claims to
justify its use.21 Shareholders act as dummies or stand-ins for the most efficient governance
orientation because representing shareholder interests is simply the most effective
mechanism for achieving efficient outcomes.22
Each of  these themes can be seen as an ideological attempt to dis-embed the economy
and assert that it is self-regulating. The dispersal of  ownership that Berle had identified was
still evident, but these approaches do not rely on “true” ownership to justify claims for the
primacy of  shareholders’ interests. However, the paucity of  the claims of  neoliberal
corporate governance can be seen when looking at the central market mechanism for
achieving efficiency or lowering agency costs, the hostile takeover. First, it is clear that the
so-called market for corporate control through hostile takeovers could not have increased
shareholder value if  it were not for the previous corporate policy of  retaining earnings.
Second, although this market isn’t directly controlled by the state, it has developed a
framework of  controls over takeovers which tend to a shareholder primacy outcome. 
On the first point, a study in 1952 showed that only 52 per cent of  corporate earnings
(revenues after taxes, running costs and sales) were paid out in dividends, 46 per cent of
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18 Originating with A A Alcian and H Demsetz, “Production, information costs, and economic organisation”
(1972) 62 American Economic Review 777, p. 778. 
19 M Jensen and W Meckling, “Theory of  the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure”
(1976) 3 Journal of  Financial Economics 305. 
20 Coase’s emphasis on efficiency envisaged the most efficient outcome as the necessary result of  market
relations no matter from what position the parties began transacting. Coase’s theorem inspired new more pro-
active thinking on promoting efficiency.
21 A West, “Corporate governance convergence and moral relativism” (2009) 17 Corporate Governance: An
International Review 107. 
22 H Demsetz, “Information and efficiency: another viewpoint” (1969) 12 Journal of  Law & Economics 1, p. 6.
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shares purchased by private individuals were for long-term investments and 75 per cent of
all transactions had been for investment purposes rather than speculation.23Mitchell argues
that the increase in share price in the post-war period to the 1960s came from retained
earnings. Thus, when changes in regulation facilitated an explosion in hostile tender bids,
successful bidders using high-yield debt had access to asset-rich companies at knock-down
prices, based on deflated share prices. The large oligopolies of  the New Deal did not make
shareholder value a governance priority, in part reflecting the community ideal.24 This new-
found wealth was not created because of  market efficiency but because the government had
enabled investors to get access to corporate wealth.
In the UK in the post-war period, companies had also become untapped piggy banks
whose shares and assets were grossly undervalued. This was in large part because of
government policies to restrict dividends and because the value of  company assets had
rapidly increased. Here, hostile takeovers began in the 1950s (following the better financial
disclosures required by the Companies Act 1948)25 but did not become an established
feature of  the UK economy until the 1980s, partly because of  management resistance to
them. Charles Clore’s hostile takeover of  Sears in 1953 was the first successful hostile
takeover bid which was able to exploit the advantages of  the post-1948 environment but
many attempts followed this. So, in response to the threat of  further hostile takeovers, many
companies began to take defensive measures.26 A study of  a sample of  companies showed
that anti-takeover measures (including dual shares and voting restrictions on some shares or
share blocks by insiders) increased from 3.7 per cent in 1950 to 11.1 per cent in 1965.27
Alternatively, a number of  companies sought protection from hostile takeovers through the
use of  a protective parent company. For example, Whitbread had substantial stakes in many
smaller breweries to protect it from unfavourable alternative takeovers, forming what was
known as the “Whitbread Umbrella”.28
Government policy in the UK enabled shareholders, or to be more precise, institutions
which owned shares, to thwart management resistance to takeovers. In 1959, institutional
shareholders formed part of  a committee set up in that year to self-regulate takeovers. The
committee devised a voluntary code of  conduct to regulate takeover bids which emphasised
shareholder primacy and promoted a shareholder’s choice to sell, timely information and
board neutrality.29 This was followed by the 1968 City Code on Takeovers which
emphasised shareholder choice and included a general ban on frustrating actions without
the approval of  the shareholders. The code was overseen by the Takeover Panel which was
comprised in part by institutional shareholders.30 Polanyi’s assertion that “the road to the
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 62(4)
23 Lawrence Mitchell, using evidence gained from a NYSE study cited in L Mitchell, “Financialism: a (very) brief
history” (2010) 43 Creighton Law Review 323; P Zumbansen and C Williams (eds), The Embedded Firm
(Cambridge: CUP forthcoming); GWU Legal Studies Research Paper, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1655739 (last accessed 10 October 2010).
24 As W Reich put it, following the New Deal period, Americans gained as employees and as citizens – although
not as shareholders or consumers. W Reich, Supercapitalism: The transformation of  business, democracy, and everyday
life (Knopf: Borzoi Books 2007). 
25 L Hannah, “Takeover bids in Britain before 1950: an exercise in business ‘pre-History’” (1974) 16 Business
History 65.
26 J Armour and D Skeel, “Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why? The peculiar divergence of  US
and UK takeover regulation” (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 1727, p. 1768. 
27 J Franks, C Mayer and S Rossi, “Ownership, evolution and regulation” (2006) http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354381, p. 11 (last accessed 4 September 2011).
28 Ibid. p. 4. 
29 Issuing Houses Association, Notes on Amalgamation of  British Business (London: Issuing Houses Association
1959), available at http://nla.gov.au/nla.aus-vn4764542 (last accessed 1 August 2010).
30 Armour and Skeel, “Who writes the rules?”, n. 26 above. 
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free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally
organised and controlled interventionism”31 is thus evidenced in UK takeover regulation.
In both the UK and US, the political question of  why speculative investors who were
funding takeovers on massive leverage should take advantage of  accumulated value in
companies, while communities and workers lost out, was answered in the academy.
Managers were contractually bound to pursue shareholder value and to resist a takeover
because it was not in the interest of  the community and would be a breach of  their contract
with shareholders. This is not because shareholders are entitled to managerial attention by
dint of  ownership; ownership is otiose in this arrangement. The enabling of  hostile
takeovers in the shareholder primacy model was said to enhance the availability of  accurate
information on the efficiency of  a company in an accessible form. Furthermore, hostile
takeovers were justifiable and desirable because they reduced agency costs caused by self-
serving management by disciplining them with the threat of  exposure to hostile takeovers.
From the contractarian perspective, hostile takeovers ensured that managers fulfil their
contractual obligations to shareholders. From an efficiency perspective, hostile takeovers
created a more efficient economy by weeding out poorly performing managements.
Neoliberal corporate governance made directors stewards of  shareholder interests and
the state put policies into place to ensure this. Like neoclassical economics, neoliberalism
claimed that the market economy was the unadulterated expression of  human nature and
that social relations were naturally contractual in essence. Contractual man was natural man
and thus a contractual model for corporate governance was a logical extension of  this.
Polanyi famously turned this position on its head, showing that historically the market
economy was brutally forced upon a population resistant to the breakdown of  altruistic
social relations and their replacement with bargained contractual relations. Similarly, the
shift away from social policies to market policies in this period was not a natural expression
of  human nature but a reorientation to market relations imposed by the state and fashioned
from the shapes left by the former policies. 
2 Neoliberal governance and corporate crisis and the green shoots of 
shareholder stewardship
CORPORATE COLLAPSE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The interests of  shareholders were promoted in Britain in the 1980s through such policies
as transferring nationalised industries to private investors and abolishing all foreign
exchange controls. Reconstructing the regulation of  financial markets made international
finance central to the British economy. Britain’s flagging industrial economy was left to
largely collapse whilst the City’s investment went overseas to find high profits. Britain’s
transformation into a service-based economy was promoted as economic revival, the
invigorating effect of  the market and the triumph of  individualism over collectivism where
shareholder value could properly be realised. 
However, by the 1990s, many of  these successful companies were collapsing. In the UK,
at the beginning of  the decade, these included Robert Maxwell’s fraud against Maxwell
Communications Corporation, the collapse of  the Bank of  Credit and Commerce
International and that of  Polly Peck plc. 
In the UK, the problem was translated as one of  agency costs and auditing standards.
Accordingly, the matter was dealt with largely through soft law mechanisms with no attempt
to reign in by regulation or otherwise the supremacy of  shareholder primacy. The free
Polanyi’s embeddeness and shareholder stewardship
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market was still the product of  “deliberate state action”,32 however, that action was soft or
market-based governance. The Cadbury Report’s33 principal mechanism for reducing agency
costs was to divide the top roles into chief  executive and chair and to introduce non-
executive directors to oversee top executive activity (monitors for the monitors). The
subsequent Greenbury Report34 looked to rationalise “bonding costs”, the costs of  reducing
agency costs so as to ensure that performance-related pay really rewarded performance. The
subsequent Combined Code operated on a semi-voluntary model where listed companies
were not obliged to conform to the ideal model board but must explain where they had
failed to do so: the “comply or explain” model. 
This model, the product of  deliberate state action, enabled self-regulation within the
sector and sustained the shareholder primacy/short-termism model. This is hardly
surprising given the primacy given to institutional shareholders in Cadbury and subsequent
reports and their designated roles in the 1998 Combined Code and its predecessors.35
Furthermore, listed companies adopted the model without it being mandatory because the
market responded positively to companies that did so. Appealing to the market, adopting
governance structures designed to enhance shareholder value and making the largest
investors part of  the process became even more of  a guiding principle for management.
The orientation of  directors’ stewardship became ever more focused on shareholders as
other potential claimants for consideration were sidelined. 
In the US, corporate collapse on a grand scale came later in the 1990s and the
government responded with a rules-based approach to reporting requirements and
corporate governance. The corporate failures included Arthur Anderson, Worldcom,
Adelphia and the spectacular demise of  Enron. As in the UK, the regulatory response was
to control top management or chief  executive officer (CEO) activity and to ensure better
auditing standards. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002 transformed the governance and the
reporting requirements of  all companies (including non-US companies). The Act requires
that both the CEO and chief  financial officer sign off  the annual reports confirming that
they were compliant with financial reporting requirements. The Act also gives the Securities
Exchange Commission the power to require the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
NASDAQ to prohibit the listing of  securities where the company does not have an audit
committee consisting entirely of  independent directors.36 In 2003, the NYSE and
NASDAQ stock markets adopted additional governance rules which included a
requirement to have a majority of  independent directors on the board, and for independent
directors to have separate and regular meetings. The NYSE rules require that each board
has a nomination and compensation committee made up of  independent directors.37
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THE NEW ECONOMIC OWNERS38
By the 1990s, 37 per cent of  equities in the US markets were owned by financial institutions
rising to 60 per cent in 2006.39 In 1997, 52.7 per cent of  shares in the UK market were held
by institutional shareholders.40 They had been significant owners since the 1950s, owning
18 per cent in 1957. However, they became dominant owners over the next few decades and
by 1977 they owned 58 per cent of  the share market. This was accompanied by a
corresponding fall in individual ownership so that, while individuals held nearly 70 per cent
in 1957, by 1977 they owned less than 30 per cent. In contrast, institutional shareholders
owned only 7 per cent of  the US markets in 1950.41 The disparity between the two
countries may be explained by the UK’s post-war corporatist government policy which
sought to bolster organisations and to undermine private share-ownership. Institutional
investment was encouraged through dividend tax policy42 which, at the same time,
penalised individual shareholder’s income. The top marginal rate for individual shareholders
was 90 per cent until 1979. In contrast, institutional shareholders, such as insurance
companies, enjoyed extensive tax relief  while pension funds were entirely exempt from tax.
As a result, institutions rapidly increased their ownership of  shares.43
Not surprisingly, in both countries, institutional shareholders gained attention and voice
when they gained financial significance as shareholders. In the UK, as noted earlier,
institutional shareholders formed part of  the self-regulating body which managed takeovers
and designed rules which specifically favoured investors’ interests and developed
mechanisms to ensure they were followed. 
In the US, institutional shareholder ownership precipitated a growing academic debate
over shareholder empowerment and the governance role of  shareholders.44 The important
clout of  American corporate law scholarship soon brought institutional shareholders to
everyone’s attention. Institutional shareholders, unlike Berle’s dispersed shareholders, had
the economic strength to enforce contractual claims against managers and to reduce agency
costs so they seemed to scholars and policymakers ideally placed to act as “monitors”.
Importantly, their level of  ownership was substantial enough to bridge the gap between
ownership and control, described in Modern Corporation, and thus to enable neoliberal
thought to reassert shareholder entitlement as ownership entitlement.45
However, the fledgling enthusiasm for institutional shareholders dissipated from the
mid-1990s because of  their evident aversion to influencing internal corporate affairs.
Increasingly, eminent commentators raised doubts over their efficacy. John Coffee noted
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their extreme passivity.46 Furthermore, he found that, in the UK, liquidity was of  utmost
importance for institutional shareholders. This implied a lack of  long-term commitment
and therefore a correlative lack of  interest in monitoring corporate activity.47 Corporate
Codes continued to appeal to them and some academics remained enthusiastic supporters
of  their entitlement as owners but much of  the original expectation had gone. The financial
crisis of  2008 changed all that and institutional shareholders were once again crowned as
the princes of  corporate monitoring. 
3 The coming of shareholder stewardship
AN OVERVIEW
There are differing explanations for the current crisis. Some cite risky business strategies,48
or the emergence of  intricate obfuscating financial packages,49 or regulatory capture.50 But
what underlines these explanations is that the crisis was driven by short-term profit
maximisation imperatives. In recognition of  this, the most recent post-crisis corporate
governance initiatives have emphasised long-term goals rather than short-term shareholder
returns. Given this premise, it might seem perverse that a major part of  the armoury for
this restraint is the empowerment of  shareholders themselves. However, reconceptualised
as stewards, institutional shareholders have indeed been charged with ensuring the long-
term stability and social responsibility of  corporations. 
There is some logic to this given the “easy” reason for the financial crisis; managerial
greed manifested in high remuneration packages. Institutional shareholders may have a self-
interest in ensuring that there has indeed been “pay for performance” and could use their
voting power to register their assessment of  that performance.51 But, while institutional
shareholders may have a role to play in assessing management pay, it is quite a leap to view
them as willing and competent to act as guardians of  corporate stability and long-term
development. In so doing, I believe that governments are being seduced by the rhetoric of
institutional shareholders’ activism. 
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS ON WHY THEY ARE TRUSTWORTHY STEWARDS
The financial crisis has given fresh impetus to institutional shareholders’ involvement in
corporate governance issues, which had already been emerging over the last 10 years or so.
In the crisis context, their claim to be responsible and steward-like has been uncritically
accepted. Many investors have strong informal ties with government organisation concerned
with good governance. Most investors in the UK are represented by principle investor trade
associations, the Association of  British Insurers, the Investment Management Association
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and the National Association of  Pension Funds.52 These associations are led by the
Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC) which sets out best practice in its Code on the
Responsibilities of  Institutional Shareholders (ISC Code). This code is revised in line with
the Combined Code. In return, it retains significant voice in current regulative initiatives, for
example, in maintaining a dialogue with the Financial Reporting Council (FRC).
Other investors are increasingly vocal about their engagement in wider societal issues,
frequently taking on specialist advisors, such as Pensions Investment Research
Consultants,53 to advise on socially responsible investment (SRI). Similarly, Hermes, which
is wholly owned by the British Telecom pension scheme, manages 181 clients with total
assets of  £24.6bn. Hermes advocates “responsible ownership” and recommends that listed
companies should adopt a number of  principles it associates with good performance before
it will advise its clients to invest.54
The giant of  institutional shareholder organisations, the International Corporate
Governance Network (ICGN) advises institutional investors (as well as the myriad of
agents and advisors) to embrace both corporate social responsibility (CSR) and SRI by
engaging with companies to ensure their commitment to long-term, sustainable investment
and to ensure good governance practices.55 ICGN represents members from 38 countries
including professionals and policymakers as well as institutional investors managing capital
in excess of  $10 trillion.56 CSR became impossible for big companies to ignore (or to be
seen to ignore).57
The trend amongst investors toward SRI has crystallised as an approach around the
United Nations initiative, the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI).58 PRI is a set of
best practice guidelines for investors who wish to invest according to environmental, social
and corporate governance (ESG) criteria.59 The principles themselves were heavily
influenced by the involvement of  20 large institutional shareholders from 12 countries,60 as
well as reflecting the social aspirations of  Global Compact in alerting corporations to
human rights issues.61 Compliance with PRI is (like that of  Global Compact) through self-
reporting. In the former case, this is through an annual PRI reporting and assessment
survey in which members must undertake and show some progress in promoting ESG
investment.62 Members who consistently fail to show progress in their investment policies
face possible delisting. The principles are self  avowedly “voluntary and aspirational”.63
The trend toward SRI, or ESG (the currently preferred acronym), conflates what is
good for society with what is good for institutional investors. Indeed, the PRI baldly states
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that, “applying the Principles should not only lead to long term financial returns but a closer
alignment between the objectives of  institutional investors and those of  society at large”.
The PRI mission for institutional shareholders to prevail upon corporate management to
further enhance CSR operates to construct institutional shareholders as corporate stewards. 
In the wake of  the financial crisis it is a claim that the UK government has been
content to accept. Thus, the Walker Review in 2009, set up to propose reforms to the
governance of  banks and other financial institutions (as governance failure was believed to
have contributed to the financial crisis), sought the contribution of  the ISC. The Walker
Review recommended more shareholder involvement in governance monitoring,
Furthermore, as a result of  this review, the FRC brought forward its own review of  the
Combined Code so as to harmonise the governance of  all listed corporations at the same
time. As a result of  this review, the FRC concluded that shareholder monitoring of  the
code should be enhanced as an effective mechanism to improve corporate governance.64
To this end, the FRC produced the Stewardship Code (2010) which followed the
recommendation of  the Walker Review that the code should adopt the ISC Code on the
Responsibilities of  Institutional Investors.65
The guidance in the Stewardship Code is aimed, at first instance, at fund managers who
are required to “comply” with this guidance or “explain” why they have not done so on their
websites. Lacking the teeth of  even the current Combined Code’s application to listed
companies, the Stewardship Code provides little censure or incentive to comply. Investment
firms that publish their compliance on the website enjoy the doubtful honour of  being
listed on the FRC’s website. Yet, despite the minimal monitoring requirements and the
absence of  censure for non-compliance, the Stewardship Code begins with the stated hope
that this will “help long term returns”, a new stable economy.66
In the US, the degree to which shareholders should be part of  the corporate governance
process has polarised academic discussion over the last few years, with some arguing for the
enhancement of  shareholder empowerment67 and others arguing for shareholder
disempowerment68 and director primacy.69 Earlier reform had assisted the shareholder
empowerment lobby. For example, in 1992 the SEC substantially amended the proxy rules
to enable shareholders to communicate more easily in proxy solicitations by requiring
companies to include shareholders’ resolutions in its own materials.70 The financial crisis
has dramatically enhanced the trend to shareholder involvement in corporate governance as
a bulwark against avaricious and irresponsible management.71 In the USA, the Emergency
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 62(4)462
64 FRC, Consultation on a Stewardship Code for Institutional Shareholders (London: FRC January 2010), available at
www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/Stewardship%20Code%20Consultation%20January%202010.
pdf  (last assessed 1 August 2010); D Walker, “A review of  corporate governance in UK banks and other
financial industry entities” (London: July 2009), available at www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
walker_review_consultation_160709.pdf  (last assessed 1 August 2010).
65 With some amendments to encourage more interaction between investors and management and to require
attendance at AGMs, FRC, Implementation of  the UK Stewardship Code 2010 (London: FRC July 2010), p. 4,
available at: www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/Implementation%20of%20Stewardship%20
Code%20July%2020103.pdf  (last assessed 1 August 2010).
66 FRC, Consultation, n. 64 above, p. 10.
67 L A Bebchuk, “The case for increasing shareholder power” (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 833.
68 W W Bratton and M L Wachter, “The case against shareholder empowerment” (2010) 158 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 653; L A Stout, “The mythical benefits of  shareholder control” (2007) 93 Virginia Law
Review 789. 
69 S Bainbridge, “Director primacy and shareholder disempowerment” (2005–06) 119 Harvard Law Review 1735. 
70 Rule 14a-8 of  the Securities Exchange Act.
71 Bebchuk, “The case for increasing shareholder power”, n. 67 above. 
Economic Stabilisation Act of  2008 introduced “say on pay” mandates for those
institutions enjoying the Troubled Asset Relief  Program (TARP). Similarly, the Shareholder
Bill of  Rights Act introduced to the US Congress in 200972 conveyed much of  the message
about the centrality of  shareholder empowerment in current thinking.73 In introducing the
Bill, Senator Schumer stated that:
during this recession, the leadership at some of  the nations most renowned
companies took too many risks and too much in salary, while their shareholders
had too little to say. This legislation will give stockholders the ability to apply the
emergency brakes the next time the company management appears to be heading
off  a cliff. 
What is interesting about this debate is that it trails reality. Shareholders’ had a great deal
to say before the financial crisis and management was already divesting itself  of  power in
response to shareholder demands. For example, because, shareholders thought the market
in corporate control did indeed optimise shareholder value, corporations had already largely
abandoned staggered boards (the most effective defence against hostile takeovers), with
only 16 per cent of  companies having them in 2008 compared to 44 per cent in 1998.74 Ed
Rock’s work also evidences how much CEOs listened to what institutional shareholders had
to say, so that, by 2008, 18 Standard & Poor (S&P) 100 companies used plurality voting
(which assures that all nominated directors are generally elected, thus a desirable outcome
for management), down from 90 in 2003.75 Rock observed that in all cases “boards just
caved in to demands for majority voting”.76 None of  this provided protection against
corporate failure. The 15 worst-performing stocks in the S&P 500 companies were less
likely to have staggered boards and no more likely to have poison pills than the best
performers.77 Indeed, 80 per cent did not have staggered boards, 80 per cent did not have
a poison pill in place and 73 per cent had a majority-voting or director-resignation policy. 
In both the UK and the US, from the late 1970s, directors as stewards for shareholders
anticipated what shareholders would want. As institutions increased their ownership of
shares, neoliberal governance sought (through the codes) the views of  the now more
identifiable owners. Over this period, we saw successive corporate scandals and then global
financial crisis. The current response to crisis retains market-based corporate governance
strategies, but now requests institutional investors to be more active. It requires them to be
the stewards, partly prompted by institutions’ own claims to socially responsible activities.
In the final section, I assess the veracity and efficacy of  institutional stewardship.
4 Institutional shareholders as stewards
WHO ARE THEY AND HOW DO THEY BEHAVE?
In order to be good stewards, institutional shareholders need to be both active in corporate
governance and guided by social responsibility. However, institutional shareholders only
seem active when engaged in social irresponsibility and rapaciousness, otherwise they are
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inactive. Broadly speaking, pension funds fall into the latter category, hedge funds in the
former. Pension funds have the largest proportion of  shareholdings with public pension
funds in the US holding “approximately 20% of  publicly traded US equity (or $2.5 trillion)
at the end of  2004–5”.78 Since the financial crisis, the value of  equities has fallen
considerably so that the UK stock market, valued at £1158.4 billion in 2006 has fallen to
£699.8billion (or by 37.7 per cent) since the end of  2008.79 However, the proportion of
shareholdings owned by different institutions has remained fairly constant with pension
funds owning 12.8 per cent of  all UK equity value.80 The lower proportion of  equities held
by pension funds in the UK market is a result of  the increasingly internationalised character
of  this market. In 2008, 41.5 per cent of  UK equities were owned by foreign investors, up
from 11.3 per cent in 1990.81
Despite the differences between the US and UK markets, pensions still hold a significant
proportion of  total equities, however, few utilise it to any effect, let alone as stewards.
Recent work on pension funds’ governance activity in the US concluded that they have “a
very limited spectrum of  activities” where “smaller funds delegate more function to active
portfolio management and proxy advisory services, such as Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS)”.82 This study found that 53.9 per cent of  the funds never submitted a letter
to management, and 64 per cent  never met with management.83 They found that public
pension funds did not tend to pursue the company-specific forms of  activism which impact
on corporate governance.84 Furthermore, they found that public pension funds had very
little familiarity “with existing empirical evidence on corporate governance, such as studies
analysing the value of  poison pills, independent boards, or shareholder litigation”.85 This
evidence suggests that pension funds largely do not have the tools to be successful activists,
let alone successful stewards.
Pension funds remain the largest of  the institutional shareholders in the US86 (insurance
companies are the largest in the UK with 13.4 per cent of  total equities in 2008),87 however,
they are not the fastest growing. Thus, the governance potential of  institutional
shareholders must also be assessed by observing the activity of  mutual funds whose
holdings in the US rose from 7 per cent in 1990 to 28 per cent in 2006. Rock cites the
activities of  Fidelity, Lord Abbett & Co. and Morgan Stanley, which led a campaign to get
the New York Time Co. to alter its share structure (which assured control for the founding
family, Sulzberger), among other campaigns.88
However, while these funds are clearly powerful, they are far from stewards. Most
institutional shareholders are more concerned with short-term profits and only differ as to
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the rapacious way they will pursue that. Hedge funds, for example, are highly rapacious.
From 2001–2006, 236 activist hedge funds were involved in 1056 publicly traded targets.89
Bratton’s study showed that activist hedge funds used three main strategies to increase
shareholder value, which included increasing leverage, returning capital to shareholders and
selling corporate assets.90 None of  these does anything more than undermine a stable
capital base. Further evidence of  their concern with short-term gains is provided by the
times in which they are active. In the bull market, they were highly active. In 2007, hedge
funds conducted 137 activist campaigns which have involved giant corporations such as
McDonald’s, Time-Warner, Blockbuster and Kraft. However, in the bear market, where
opportunities to ruthlessly pursue shareholder value have evaporated, they have withdrawn
from activism to a high degree.91 In other words, they’re never around when you need them. 
For institutional shareholders to be effective stewards they must be both active and
concerned with stewardship-like governance. In the UK, institutional shareholders are very
conservative in their strategies. They invest in the largest companies and are guided by
listings. In 2008, 84.3 per cent of  pension funds investment in UK equities was invested in
the FTSE 100 companies.92 In the US, Professor Bushee’s classification of  institutional
investors suggests that in fact they are mainly either inactive or active in a self-interested and
non-stewardship-like way. Based on investment strategies from 1983–2002, Bushee sets out
three different types of  investor: “transient”, “dedicated” and “quasi-indexers”.93 Transient
investors, he shows, turn over 70 per cent  of  their portfolios each quarter and represent
31 per cent of  total institutional investors. Dedicated investors were those who held onto
at least 75 per cent of  their stock for at least two years and represented 8 per cent of  total
institutional investors. The final group, quasi-indexers, maintained highly diversified
portfolios but traded infrequently. They represented 61 per cent of  total institutional
investors. The last category, though the largest, offers little in terms of  promoting
corporate governance by utilising new shareholder powers as these investors have small
stakes in companies and are not actively engaged in monitoring their investments. Such
investors rely on diversification alone as a mechanism to increase value and to balance risk.
The next largest group, the transient shareholders, are, Bushee notes, commonly involved
in takeover activity and are frequently involved in overbidding for acquisitions. Bushee also
noted that as institutional shareholders’ fund managers refer to quarterly earnings per share
(EPS) the influence of  transitory investors will directly and negatively impact on research
and development spending. Thus, those investors who are active are only active in the
pursuit of  short-term personal returns with the result that they undermine long-term
productive development. 
Thus, the evidence to date shows that, in the few instances where institutional
shareholders are activist, it is for short-term profiteering only, not for the long-term
strategic governance envisaged by shareholder stewardship.
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WHY INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDS WOULD NOT HAVE MADE BETTER CHOICES
THAN A SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY-DRIVEN MANAGEMENT AND AVOIDED CRISIS
The claim in this section is that institutional shareholder stewards would have made much
worse choices because not only would they be driven by shareholder primacy goals, their
decision-making would have been less informed and less rational than that of  a
professional management. Initiatives like the Stewardship Code can do nothing to alter
those fundamentals. 
Institutional investors make choices about investments based on external indicators
such as share price. From a neoliberal perspective, that is a good thing as share price is the
most effective and accurate indicator of  real value. It is the reification of  rational economic
actors’ calculation of  risk, return and current interest rates (inter alia). But is what investors
think something is worth the same as what it is worth? Schiller argues that it is not.
Rationality, he argues, does not primarily determine investors’ choices and an “irrational
exuberance” characterises much investment activity.94 In his study of  the psychology of
investment he shows that investors may continue to have high expectations of  share prices
throughout sustained periods of  high price–earnings ratio (P/E).95While real rises in share
values will follow periods of  economic depression, this will quickly even out, although
investors will continue with the expectation that real share value will rise at the same rate.
Similarly, Froud et al.’s study of  average returns from shares listed in the S&P 500 from
1982–2002 showed that the rise in share prices did not correlate with the annual return on
those shares. Indeed, their statistics show that annual return was frequently below the
prevailing rate of  interest.96 The absence of  correlation between returns and share price has
been variously explained as the incompetence of  investors97 or the sheer volume of  active
investors operating in the market. In the latter explanation, demand itself  has led to price
increases. As Lynne Dallas points out, “concurrent with the rise of  institutional
shareholders has been an increased turnover of  stock so that whilst only 12% of  stock
changed hands in 1960 this increased to 87% in 2005”.98 The rise of  institutional
shareholders as players in the stock market has obfuscated real value under the sheer weight
of  buying and selling which has inflated prices. 
In their challenge to the growing shareholder empowerment hegemony, Bratton and
Wachter argue that we cannot expect shareholders to make better choices than management
because there are information asymmetries between the two. Investors act without all the
information, and certainly with much less information than managers, therefore it is not
“strong form” efficient.99 The market cannot assimilate all relevant information and
enhanced disclosure is often dismissed as too costly. Thus, they conclude, as the market can
only assimilate all public information, it cannot be more than a “semi-strong form”. Bratton
and Wachter also cite a body of  literature which shows how incompetent the market is
when confronted with new technologies. Investors’ inability to objectively assess the real
value of  shares in new technology companies results in an “irrational exuberance” or an
urgency to buy which results in high-volume trading and speculative bubbles. Their
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position, is not, of  course an argument against shareholder primacy, merely that
shareholders are not competent to make decisions in their own interest and could
potentially introduce more irrationality and instability into the market if  allowed to do so. 
Thus, despite institutional investors’ claims to undertake considered and socially
responsible investment such as would justify their role as stewards, the evidence suggests
the contrary. It would seem that, not only would they have pursued shareholder primacy
with even more alacrity than performance-pay-driven management, they would have done
so in a less informed and more destructive manner. Institutional investors range from the
slothful (typical in pension funds) to the rapacious (typical in hedge funds), but they all
share the same lack of  managerial competencies. Given this, shareholder stewardship as a
mechanism to bolster better self-regulation seems to have no solid evidential foundation as
to its efficacy. 
Conclusion
Shifting responsibility onto shareholders in the shareholder stewardship model is an attempt
to “fix” the market so that it can successfully self-regulate and avoid crisis. However, as
Polanyi shows, the market fails because of  its disembedded (or alienating) nature. Self-
regulation can never work because it relies on ideological confidence in the market which
Polanyi teaches us is only maintainable by external and frequently violent intervention.
Historically, “the self-regulating market was unknown; indeed the emergence of  the idea of
self-regulation was a complete reversal of  the trend of  development”.100
Shareholder stewardship is thought to be an effective form of  self-regulation because
owners will more efficiently reduce the agency costs inherent in modern corporations.
However, management failure to adhere to its “contractual” obligations to shareholders in
seeking shareholder value was not the cause of  the crises. Indeed, it was the very pursuit of
profit maximisation, the very adhering to this “obligation” in an enabling environment,
which has precipitated crises. 
Institutional shareholders are thought to be effective stewards because they have self-
adopted responsible investment codes. However, evidence shows that they are variously ill
informed, inactive or self-interestedly active. It is not in their nature to be socially
responsible because their interest is in profit maximisation alone. And, as this article has
attempted to show, effective stewardship was traditionally posited on an absence of  self-
interest in profit maximisation. Thus, management in large corporations where shareholders
were dispersed were ideally placed to act as stewards where the social and economic policies
of  the government could ensure that the corporation was governed to meet the needs of
the wider community. During such periods, a degree of  re-embeddedness was assumed. 
The shift to neoliberalism and market-based governance disembedded the economy
again. It was because governance sought to bind management to shareholder interests that
managements were no longer capable of  acting as stewards. It is, therefore, even less
plausible to look to institutional shareholders themselves to establish stewardship when it is
they who have the greatest self-interest in profit maximisation and, arguably, the least in
wider public concerns.
Shareholder stewardship will be no more effective than previous market-based
governance strategies because the market is not essentially self-regulating. As the financial
crisis has shown, it requires significant state intervention to ensure its existence and then to
manage the social problems it causes. The neoliberals are wrong and Polanyi was right.
Institutional investors cannot deliver governance which enhances long-term progress and
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stability because it is contrary to their nature, despite what their platitudinous codes and
principles say. In the fable of  the scorpion and the frog, the scorpion must sting the frog
that is carrying him across the river and whom he has promised not to harm. He will do so
even though they will both drown as a result. The scorpion’s explanation? “I’m a scorpion;
it’s in my nature.”
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